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The main reason for the abandonment of the rule in Durham v.
United States' was to escape the "undue dominance by the experts" in
determining a defendant's mental responsibility.2
The Court of Appeals had devised the Durham rule, eighteen years
before, mainly to meet the complaints of the psychiatric profession
that under the traditional M'Naghten and irresistible impulse tests, they
were obliged, when called to testify, "to reach outside of their pro-
fessional expertise when they were asked . . .whether the defendant
knew right from wrong," and were prevented from conveying to the
judge and jury the full range of information relevant to assessing
the defendant's responsibility. Durham was intended to permit medical
experts to testify on medical matters without the confusion that many
of them experienced in testifying under the older rule.
But although intended to facilitate the giving of expert testimony on
medical data, in practice it also opened the door to conclusions ren-
dered by experts on the non-medical, legal issue of the defend-
ant's responsibility. It opened the door to "trial by label," by failing to
make clear what abnormality of mind was an essential ingredient
of mental "disease" or "defect." Absent a legal definition of these
terms, the psychiatrists naturally tended to give them medical mean-
ings. The court had attempted to meet this in McDonald v. United
States,4 by providing a legal definition: "mental disease or defect"
included "any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially af-
fects mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior
controls." This definition, says the court, "was useful in the ad-
ministration of justice because it made plain that clinical and legal def-
initions of mental disease were distinct, and it helped the jury to sort
out its complex task and to focus on the matters given to it to decide."'
* Professor, Emeritus, University of New Mexico School of Law. Ph.B., 1926,
J.D., 1928, J.S.D., 1930, University of Chicago.
1. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
2. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3. Id. at 976.
4. 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
5. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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But the Durham rule was found also to require explication to re-
solve the ambiguity inherent in the word "product." Therefore in
Carter v. United States," the court explained that productivity required
that there "be a relationship between the disease and the criminal act;
and the relationship must be such as to justify a reasonable inference
that the act would not have been committed if the person had not been
suffering from the disease." In short, Carter identified productivity
with "but for" causation.
But productivity presented other problems. Because the concept was
so decisive a factor in the test, allowing experts to testify expressly to
productivity raised concern lest the issue be in fact turned over to the
experts rather than determined by the jury for itself.7
Thus it came about that in Washington v. United States8 the court
forbade experts to testify as to productivity. "Psychiatrists," it con-
cluded, "should not speak directly in terms of 'product,' or even 're-
sult' or 'cause.'" Unfortunately, in the almost contemporaneous case of
Harried v. United States,9 the court had seemed to differentiate between
asking expert witnesses whether the act was the "product" of the dis-
ease, and asking them whether there was a "causal relationship."
Whether Washington overruled Harried, or whether it only forbade
"direct" testimony in such terms, but still allowed "indirect" reference
to the issue, was apparently not clear, as shown by the action of the
trial judge in the instant case, who ruled that the expert witnesses
would not be allowed to testify to productivity, but then permitted
questions concerning the existence of a "causal relationship."
So finally in United States v. Braivner'0 the court came to the con-
clusion that it was necessary to abandon Durham, to escape from the
undue dominance by the experts, which had survived even the McDon-
ald modification. "There is," the court concluded, "no generally ac-
cepted understanding, either in the jury or the community it repre-
sents, of the concept requiring that the crime be the 'product' of the
mental disease."" The medical experts, called to adduce information
concerning the "medical" component of the responsibility issue, came
6. 252 F.2d 608, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
7. This concern had been expressed by then Circuit Judge Warren Burger in
Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
8. 390 F.2d 444, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
9. 389 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
10. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
11. Id. at 982.
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to express, in terms of "product," ethical and legal conclusions. It is
ironic, the court said, that a rule adopted "to permit experts to testify
in their own terms concerning matters within their domain which the
jury should know, resulted in testimony by the experts in terms not
their own to reflect unexpressed judgments in a domain that is prop-
erly not theirs but the jury's." 12 The sound solution, the court decided,
"lies not in further shaping of the Durham 'product' approach in
more refined molds, but in adopting the ALI's formulation as the
linchpin of our jurisprudence."' 3
In doing so, the court added a number of clarifying corollary rules:
a. Because the AL test lacks a definition of "mental disease or de-
fect," the court ruled that the McDonald definition would be en-
grafted thereon.
b. The ALI formulation allows an option in wording: A person is
not responsible for criminal conduct if as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacked "substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminal-
ity [wrongfulness] of his conduct ... " The court chose "wrongful-
ness" as the preferable term. 4
12. Id. at 983.
13. Id. In adopting the AL test, the Court of Appeals joins the courts of
appeals in almost all the other circuits. Cases in which the ALI test has been adopted
are, by circuit: United States v. Tarrago, 398 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Benus, 305 F.2d 821 (3d
Cir. 1962); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961) (volitional part of
the test only); United States v. Taylor, 437 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Chandler, 393 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. O'Neal, 431 F.2d 695 (5th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Smith, 437 F.2d 538 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Smith, 404 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir.
1971); United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); Pope v. United States,
372 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1967) (adopting a position of neutrality); United States v.
White, 447 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1971); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Stewart, 443 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971); Wion v. United
States, 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963). Six states have adopted the ALI test by
statutes: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59,
§ 9(a) (Supp. 1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.030 (Supp. 1971); MONT. REv. CODES
ANN. § 95-501 (1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1967); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 4801 (1958). Four states have adopted ALI by judicial decision: State v.
White, 93 Idaho 153, 456 P.2d 797 (1969); Terry v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 862
(Ky. 1963); Commonwealth v. MeHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 226 N.E.2d 556 (1967); State
v. Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966) (at election of accused).
14. The choice is sound. The argument for preferring "wrongfulness" is presented
in Weihofen, Capacity to Appreciate "Wrongfulness" or "Criminality" under the
ALl-Model Penal Code Test of Mental Responsibility, 58 J. CmIM. L.C. & P.S. 27
(1967).
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c. The ALI formula has a second paragraph, which reads:
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct.
The purpose of this was to exclude so-called "sociopathic person-
alities" from the insanity defense. The District of Columbia court had
already said that the mere existence of a long criminal career does not
excuse crime. The caveat paragraph is therefore not needed. 1r
In addition to the question of the test wording, the court discussed
a number of collateral problems.
1. Closely related to the question of a proper test, and perhaps most
important in affording possibilities for future development, is the court's
adoption of the doctrine that mental condition, although insufficient to
exonerate, may be relevant to negative the specific mental element
of certain crimes or degrees of crime. The clearest example is the
element of premeditation and deliberation for first-degree murder.
Under the doctrine, a person who is not so mentally diseased as to
be unable to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law may nevertheless, be-
cause of such disease, not have acted deliberately in committing the
homicide. Although his mental condition would therefore not suffice
to justify an acquittal by reason of insanity, it would suffice to reduce
the crime to second-degree murder.
The court declined to say whether the doctrine would also be avail-
able to reduce second-degree murder to manslaughter, where the de-
fendant's mental condition negatived malice aforethought. That
question, it said, requires further analysis and so should be remitted
to future consideration. Chief Judge Bazelon, in his full and searching
concurring opinion, would resolve that question without delay.
In accepting this doctrine, as about half the other American juris-
15. Even apart from this reason, attempting by legislative fiat or judicial decision to
exclude certain conditions such as sociopathic personality from the definition of mental
disease or defect seems unsound. And even if the purpose were sound, the ALI provi-
sion seems ineffective to accomplish it. It speaks in terms not of sociopathic personality
but of an abnormality manifested only by criminal or antisocial behavior. Any de-
fense lawyer would be able to avoid having his case come within this provision by intro-
ducing some additional evidence of mental disease or defect. See H. WEiHoFEN,
THE URGE TO PUNISH 87-90 (1956); Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6-8 (1960).
Vol. 1973:381
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dictions have done,16 the court makes available what could become an
important supplement to the established test, although thus far defense
counsel in most states have not made much use of it.'7
2. The Brawner opinion also rejected the proposal that the insanity
defense be abolished altogether, a proposal that had been urged by
writers such as Professor Joseph Goldstein of Yale and which had
also been suggested by some members of the court in prior cases, as
one way to restrict expert psychiatric judgments to the disposition stage
of criminal proceedings.' 8
3. It refused to decide the constitutionality of the 1970 addition to
the District of Columbia Code' 9 which undertook to change the bur-
den of proof rule so as to require the accused affirmatively to estab-
lish his mental irresponsibility by a preponderance of the evidence. 20
4. It reaffirmed prior cases holding that the jury has the right to know
what disposition would be made of the defendant if the jury finds him
"not guilty by reason of insanity."'"
16. The cases are collected in 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 (1968).
17. Taylor, Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime-A Commentary
on Fisher v. United States, 34 CAL. L. Rnv. 625 (1946); Weihofen & Overholser,
Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 YALE L.I. 959 (1947).
In California, the bifurcated trial has led to the use of this doctrine to bring the de-
fendant's mental condition before the jury in both parts of the trial. See People v.
Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 53 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1966); People v. Wolff, 61
Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964); Comment, Admissibility of Sub-
jective Abnormality to Disprove Criminal Mental States, 12 STAN. L. Rv. 226
(1959).
18. S. GLUECK, LAw AND PsYcHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE CORDIALE? 152
(1962); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"--Why Not?, 72 YALE LJ.
853 (1963); Weintraub, Criminal Responsibility: Psychiatry Alone Cannot Determine
It, 49 A.B.A.J. 1075 (1963); Weintraub, Insanity as a Defense, a Panel Discussion, 37
F.R.D. 365, 369 (1964); Comment, Law-Rehabilitation, A Thesis; Punishment, The
Antithesis-Insanity Defense in the Balance, 19 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 140 (1969). See
comments of then Circuit Judge Burger, quoted in Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420,
428 n.10 (10th Cir. 1963); Chief Judge Bazelon, in Washington v. United States, 390
F.2d 444, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Chief Judge Haynesworth, in United States v. Chand-
ler, 393 F.2d 921, 928 (4th Cir. 1968). Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous
Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. R.v. 514 (1968), summarizes in an appendix the leading argu-
ments that have been offered for abolition. Cf. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26
CAm. LJ. 273 (1968).
19. D.C. CODEANN. § 24-301(j) (1970).
20. The District of Columbia rule had been that the Government has the burden of
proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
About half the states follow the same rule. See cases collected in Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d
146 (1968).
21. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The court in BrawnerWashington University Open Scholarship
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5. The court agreed that the law cannot distinguish between phys-
iological, emotional, social and cultural sources of the mental im-
pairment, and that such sources may be both referred to by the expert
witnesses and considered by the trier of the facts. However, this
does not mean that such factors may be taken as a separate defense;
cultural deprivation, for example, unrelated to any abnormal condition
of the mind, is not a defense.
These collateral determinations will not be further discussed in this
paper, which is intended to focus on the main issue that the court
wrestled with, the problem of expert domination.
The court strongly denied that its purpose in abandoning Durham
was to tighten up on the insanity defense. The ALI rule it was adopt-
ing, the court said, "is contemplated as improving the process of adjudi-
cation, not as affecting number of insanity acquittals.""2  Insanity
acquittals since Durham was modified by McDonald, in 1962, had run
at about two percent of all cases terminated, and the court saw no basis
for concluding that the number or percentage of such acquittals had
been either excessive or inadequate. It also saw no way of forecasting
what the effect of the switch would be on jury verdicts. What it would
do, the court felt confident, was to provide "a sounder relationship in
terms of the giving, comprehension and application of expert testi-
mony," and enhance jury deliberations.3
Eliminating "productivity," the court hopes, will reduce the influ-
ence of expert conclusions on this legal issue and leave the jury freer
to exercise its own judgment. This undue influence, in the court's
opinion, had been due to two aspects of the Durham test: Juries were
too prone to accept expert conclusions (1) that the defendant was or
was not suffering from a mental disease or defect, and (2) that his
criminal act was the "product" thereof. The first objection was met, ap-
parently to the court's satisfaction, by McDonald, which required the
jury to be given a "legal" definition of those terms, and the Brawner
decision specifically retains that definition and incorporates it into the
new rule. The second objection is presumably disposed of by aban-
doning the rule that used the word "product." But will banishing the
word eliminate the problem? Under the ALI test that the court has now
suggested a form of instruction that would accurately reflect what the consequences of
such a verdict would be, in the light of recent statutory changes.
22. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
23. Id. at 990.
Vol. 1973:381
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adopted, the question is whether "as a result" of mental disease or de-
fect the defendant lacked capacity, etc. And indeed, any formulation
of the test necessarily involves such a causal relationship, because it
is a test of insanity as a defense, as distinguished from other defenses,
such as infancy or intoxication or somnambulism. Any wording there-
fore must express that limitation; the test does not apply to any inca-
pacity, but only incapacity resulting from mental disease or defect. So,
as Judge Bazelon says in his concurring opinion, "the critical question
is not whether the act must be related to the impairment ('mental dis-
ease,' 'defect of reason,' or whatever) but rather how directly, if at
all, the jury's attention should be focused on the question."24  One
wording may express that causal requirement more directly than an-
other. Durham, under which the only requirement for criminal irre-
sponsibility was that the defendant have a mental disease or defect and
that the criminal act be the product thereof, focused on that relation-
ship more singly and more emphatically than others. But the ALl
requirement that the incapacity be the "result" of the mental condi-
tion brings in the same problem. The M'Naghten rule hides it best,
by wording the question as whether the defendant "was labouring un-
der such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know
the nature and quality of the act he was doing," etc. But the innocuous
word "such" requires the same causal connection; its meaning would
not be changed if it were worded that the defendant should be acquitted
if he did not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing and
if such lack of knowledge was the product of mental disease or defect.
The court in Brawner admits that the ALl rule contains this require-
ment of causality, but curiously, it says nothing to explain why the
word "result" will lead to fewer difficulties than the word "product,"
which it considered the main weakness of the Durham rule. Its refer-
ence to the "result" in the ALI test consists of two sentences: "Ex-
culpation is established not by mental disease alone but only if 'as a
result' defendant lacks the substantial capacity required for responsi-
bility. Presumably the mental disease of a kleptomaniac does not en-
tail as a 'result' a lack of capacity to conform to the law prohibit-
ing rape." 5
But if the court's opinion does not articulate its reasoning on this
point, Bazelon does. Although the ALI test retains (necessarily) the
24. Id. at 1022 (emphasis original).
25. Id. at 991.
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"core requirement" of productivity in the sense that there must be a
"meaningful relationship between the mental illness and the incident
charged," the question of causality does not occupy the position of
prominence that it does under Durham. By eliminating the word
"product," the court can eliminate the vocabulary that was "conduc-
ive to a testimonial mystique permitting expert dominance and en-
croachment on the jury's function. 26
This reasoning, says Bazelon, suggests that the primary goal is to
de-emphasize the question of productivity or causality. But he suspects
that the ALI test will not bring us closer to that goal. The difficulty
of applying the ALI causality requirement-and hence the amount
of attention that requirement will attract-is likely to vary with the na-
ture of the defendant's impairment. If he cannot distinguish right from
wrong generally (i.e. with respect to any act or most of his acts) the
jury is likely to conclude that his impairment "caused" his act. And
if the court's purpose had been to dispose of the productivity problem
by adopting a test that limited the defense to those forms of mental
disorder so severe that a relationship between the disorder and the act
could readily be found, the ALI test could be seen as serving that end.
Its wording lends itself to a restrictive interpretation: A person's ability
to control his behavior might be "substantially impaired" (and so meet
the Durham-McDonald test), yet he might retain "substantial capacity"
(and so fail the ALI test). The reporter for the Model Penal Code him-
self said the test would have the effect of limiting the defense to "the
most severe afflictions of the mind," 27 and some of the courts that
have adopted the test have given it such a narrow interpretation.2 8
26. Id. at 1023.
27. Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLU.M. L. REV. 1425, 1443 (1968).
28. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in adopting the ALI test, agreed with
Judge Burger that it was "essentially M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse recast in mod-
ern terminology." That court was "content to adhere to" its prior rule "in the more
simplified and understandable language of the ALI formulation." Wion v. United
States, 325 F.2d 420, 426-27 (10th Cir. 1963). The Fourth Circuit also seems to regard
the ALI test as only making a cosmetic change. In United States v. Butler, 409 F.2d
1261 (4th Cir. 1969), that court held that the trial court had not erred in instructing the
jury in terms of M'Naghten plus irresistible impulse. "Appellant's able and zealous
counsel on appeal was unable to point to any significant difference between the charge
given and the one refused." Id. at 1262. See also United States v. Chandler, 393 F.2d
920, 929 (4th Cir. 1968) (ALI test does not exculpate "all those persons for whose
deviant conduct there may be some psychiatric explanation").
In other circuits, however, the ALI test has been interpreted broadly. In the ninth and
Vol. 1973:381
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But retention of the McDonald definition of mental disease or defect has
the effect, as the court says, of expanding the defense beyond the grav-
est types of mental disorder. Under the McDonald definition, if the
defendant's mental processes or emotional controls are "substantially
impaired," it matters not whether the impairment results from a psy-
chosis or from a neurosis or sociopathic personality. But the latter
conditions, more often than psychosis, may significantly affect some
aspect of behavior while leaving the personality substantially intact.
Where that seems to be the situation, disputes are likely to arise con-
cerning the relationship of the act to the impairment, and the causal
relationship requirement may be used, by prosecutors and perhaps by
juries, as a basis for rejecting the irresponsibility defense.
Whereas Durham focused on the relationship between the mental
illness and the act, the ALl test focuses on the relationship between the
defendant's illness and his impairment. Will this help alleviate or
eliminate the productivity problem? Judge Bazelon thinks not. The
question of the relationship between the impairment and the particular
act charged remains, even though it is concealed in two questions
which are implicit in the ALI test: Could the defendant appreciate the
wrongfulness of the act he committed, and could he have conformed
his action to the requirements of law? The test uses the word "con-
duct" but it does not mean conduct generally; it talks of his capacity
"at the time of such conduct," i.e. the time of the act charged. And,
as said, where the defense is based on one of the lesser forms of men-
tal illness, the question of whether such illness produced a lack of
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act will still
second circuits, it is clear that the courts of appeals regard the ALI test as more liberal
than M'Naghten, because they reversed convictions in which the jury was instructed
in M'Naghten terms. Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966). Some cases have expressed the view
that there is no significant difference between ALI and Durham-McDonald. Wade
v. United States, supra; United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 726-27 (6th Cir. 1968);
Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 735 (8th Cir. 1967). The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals interprets ALI as working a measurable change in the old test, but not so
great as to include sociopaths. United States v. O'Neal, 431 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1970);
Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1969). But in the seventh circuit, the
court in adopting the ALI test reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial al-
though the evidence established nothing more than sociopathy. United States v. Sha-
piro, 383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967). But cf. United States v. Gorman, 393 F.2d 209
(7th Cir. 1968) (no insanity instruction required where testimony was that accused had
"a psychoneurotic reaction, depressive type," but that his ability to reason logically
was unimpaired).
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be with us. The Brawner case itself illustrates such a situation. The
experts on both sides agreed that defendant was mentally ill, afflicted
with some type of organic brain pathology associated with an explo-
sive personality disorder. The act for which he was charged, shoot-
ing through a closed door in retaliation for a blow on the jaw a short
while before, could be (and was by two experts) found to be consistent
with and related to his mental condition-or it could be found to have
been committed (as one expert put it) "to get even with someone who
broke [his] jaw." However one words it, this is the problem of pro-
ductivity.*9
The court will thus continue to face inquiries into causality in many
cases. The numerous references to the causality question in the
Brawner opinion indicate a recognition that this is so.
The critical question, therefore, says Judge Bazelon, is how the pro-
ductivity issue will be presented to the jury. The Durham mistake of
giving the false impression that it is a medical question must be avoided.
The ALI test itself may be of some help because it does not invite di-
rect expert testimony that defendant's impairment did or did not "cause"
the act. But by avoiding highlighting the issue, that test may only
hide it without eliminating it. It may repeat the mistake it points out
concerning Durham: "the articulation of a catch-phrase that facilitates
conclusory expert testimony and that obscures the moral and legal
overtones of the productivity question." The expert, instead of testi-
fying that the act was not the "product" of the disease, can now assert
that the disease did not "result" in a lack of substantial capacity to ap-
preciate or to conform."
The Washington rule, that psychiatrists should not be permitted to
testify to a conclusion on whether or not the criminal act was the "prod-
uct" of mental disease or defect, is abrogated in Braivner in one sub-
ordinate clause of one sentence: "Since both Washington and Harried
are superseded-on this point-by our change today of the ultimate
rule...."I This abrogation strikes Bazelon as "inexplicable" inas-
much as the court repeatedly acknowledges that under the new rule
the causality requirement remains. The effect, says Bazelon, is now
to permit experts to testify in conclusory terms, so long as the term
used is "result" instead of "product." If, as was agreed by all the mem-
29. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 977-78 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 1027.
31. Id. at 1003.
Vol. 1973:38]
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bers of the court, the primary objection to the "product" requirement
was that it facilitated expert domination of the decision, and the aim of
the Washington rule was to eliminate such domination, it seems opti-
mistic for the court to assume that that danger is eliminated by
adoption of the new test.
Might it have been more effective, instead of abrogating Washing-
ton, to strengthen it by forbidding expert witnesses to testify in any of
the terms of the test question? That is, if the Durham test were retained,
forbid the experts to testify to either productivity or the existence of
mental disease or defect; if the ALT test is substituted, forbid testimony
as to whether the defendant could or could not "appreciate" "wrong-
fulness" or "conform." It is true that the Washington rule did not work
very effectively, but that was largely because it was weakened from
the outset by the court's ambiguity about whether it prohibited only
testimony stated in terms of "productivity" or whether it also forbade
conclusions about "causal relationship." If instead of moving to a new
set of test concepts, the court had tightened up the Washington rule,
might it have succeeded finally in forcing the experts to present the
details about the defendant's mental functioning from which the jury
could itself reach a conclusion on the test question? It would at least
spare the experts from having to do what they have been telling us they
feel incompetent to do, to speak to these judgmental questions. By
abrogating Washington, will not the court encourage counsel in doing
what they have shown themselves so prone to do even in the face of
discouragement, to get the expert to give conclusory answers to the test
questions and so in effect tell the jury whether the defendant should
or should not be held responsible?
Continuance of the danger of expert dominance may also be facili-
tated by the court's rejection of suggestions for disentangling the in-
sanity defense from a medical model. The irresponsibility defense
must be predicated on the existence of an "ascertainable condition char-
acterized by 'a broad consensus that free will does not exist.' ",32
Bazelon fears that this will work to effect "a delegation of sweeping
new authority to the medical experts." True, the court expressly rules
that all evidence, not merely medical, may be presented to the jury.
But that is already allowed under the rules of evidence. "The real im-
pact of the court's decision is to establish a barrier which will prevent
32. Id. at 995, quoting Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (Wright, J., concurring).
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some defendants from taking any evidence at all to the jury on the is-
sue of responsibility. The power to open and close that barrier is ef-
fectively delegated to the psychiatric experts."33
This new requirement also may work to undermine the "some evi-
dence" rule. In the District of Columbia, if some evidence relevant
to the insanity issue has been presented, the issue must be put to the
jury. But as Bazelon reads Brawner, a defendant can now introduce
some evidence that his capacity to control his behavior was in fact im-
paired, yet not be allowed to take the issue to the jury unless he can
also offer "convincing evidence" that he is suffering from a medically
recognized condition characterized by "a broad consensus that free
will does not exist."
The court does not explain why the boundary of the legal concept of
responsibility must be marked by medical concepts, especially when
the validity of the "medical model" is seriously questioned by some
eminent psychiatrists. Nor does the court explain what it means by
"convincing evidence" of the existence of a "broad consensus." How
many psychiatrists on one side will suffice to give a "broad consensus"?
A broad consensus about "free will" seems particularly difficult to at-
tain, for psychiatrists are not in the habit of discussing that philosoph-
ical concept. This, says Bazelon, gives an ironic twist to the history
of the insanity defense. "Under M'Naghten, medical experts effec-
tively answered moral and legal questions, and cloaked the answers in
medical terminology. The court now seems to ask experts to make
moral and legal determinations about the nature of an exculpatory con-
dition, and invites them to state their conclusions in non-medical
terms."" But perhaps the court's reference to free will is not in-
tended to carry philosophical implications, but is shorthand for the
ALI requirement of substantial capacity to conform to the requirements
of law. If so, why does the court omit reference to the appreciation
part of the test?
Judge Bazelon would prefer a rule that would instruct the jury to
acquit the defendant if, because of his mental disease or defect, he can-
not justly be held responsible. This was one alternative to the ALI
formulation submitted by the drafters of the Model Penal Code.
The jury's function, says Bazelon, is first to measure the extent to
33. Id. at 1028.
34. Id. at 1029 (emphasis original).
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which the defendant's mental and emotional processes were impaired,
and second to evaluate that impairment in the light of community stand-
ards of blameworthiness. Nothing in the court's opinion, he says,
suggests a departure from "our long-standing view" that the second
of these functions "is the very essence of the jury's role." And he
quotes from the court's opinion: "The jury is concerned with applying
the community understanding of this broad rule to particular lay and
medical facts. Where the matter is unclear it naturally will call on its
own sense of justice to help it determine the matter.""3
The best hope for the new test, he says, "is that jurors will regu-
larly conclude that no one-including the experts-can provide a
meaningful answer to the questions posed by the ALI test"-questions
which present "such unfamiliar, if not incomprehensible, concepts
as the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's action, and the
capacity to conform one's conduct to the requirements of law."30 In
searching for some semblance of an intelligent test, they may be
forced to consider whether it would be just to hold the defendant respon-
sible. The court seems to read the ALI test as allowing the jury "suf-
ficient latitude so that it can give the instruction an application that
harmonizes with its sense of justice. ' 7  Bazelon would favor telling
the jury candidly that that is their function. The experts then would be
asked "a single question: What is the nature of the impairment of the
defendant's mental and emotional processes and behavior controls?"38
It would leave for the jury the question whether that impairment was
such as to relieve the defendant of responsibility for the act charged.
The ALI ultimately rejected this alternative approach, because some
members of the Council "deemed it unwise to present questions of
justice to the jury, preferring a submission that in form, at least, confines
the inquiry to fact."39  The court in Brawner shared this view. An
instruction cast simply in terms of justice, it says, would permit the jury
to convict or acquit without regard to any fixed legal standards. "It is
one thing. . . to tolerate and even welcome the jury's sense of equity
as a force that affects its application of instructions which state the le-
gal rules that crystallize the requirements of justice as determined by the
35. Id. at 1030-31.
36. Id. at 1031.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1032.
39. Id. at 1033.
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lawmakers of the community. It is quite another to set the jury at
large, without such crystallization, to evolve its own legal rules and
standards of justice. '40
But Bazelon thinks that the legal rules provided by the ALI test,
and particularly its requirement that the jury determine whether there
has been substantial impairment, provides no real "crystallization" of
the requirements of justice. The test offers the jury no real help in
making the "intertwining moral, legal, and medical judgments" expected
of it. In fact, it may lull the jury into assuming that the question of
responsibility can best be resolved by experts. It "does nothing to sort
out for the jury the difference between its function and the function of
the expert witnesses." The "justly" rule would come directly to grips
with the problem of expert dominance. And it would confront juries
squarely with the task of "giving defendants the kind of careful, indi-
vidual study that should precede any decision as consequential as the
imposition of moral condemnation on another human being. "41
The problem of expert dominance might be further mitigated if the
courts, in explaining the ALI test to juries, would offer a clearer and
simpler explanation of what is meant by "mental disease." Although
the American Psychiatric Association in its amicus brief to Brawner
said that the ALI test "affords a standard of criminal responsibility which
a jury can understand, '"4 2 the American Psychological Association
brief said that even the McDonald explanation of what is meant by
"mental disease" needs clarification.43 Peter Barton Hutt, as counsel
for ACLU, in his amicus brief suggested substituting "mental disabil-
ity" for "mental disease," on the ground that the latter term may mis-
lead the jury into a fruitless search for some type of tangible disease
condition. He also urged that trial courts be instructed to advise the
40. Id. at 989. Both the prosecution and the defense took a similar view. So did
the bar association of the District. The prosecution's brief argued that specific appeals
to -justice" would result in litigating extraneous issues and encourage improper argu-
ments phrased solely in terms of sympathy and prejudice. Amicus curiae William H.
Dempsey, Jr., argued that such a rule might leave the jury with the notion that the
question was the wide-open one of whether it is "just" to convict. He suggested in-
stead the wording recommended by the British Royal Commission on Capital Punishment
leaving it to the jury to determine "whether at the time of the act the accused was suf-
fering from a disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) to such a degree that he ought
not to be held responsible."
41. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
42. Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 16.
43. Brief for American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae at 13.
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jury on the intangible and uncertain nature of mental disabilities, and
suggested a form of wording for an instruction.44
Amicus curiae William H. Dempsey, Jr., would also like to elimi-
nate "mental disease or defect." He believes, however, that we need
some term that relates the issue to a pathological mental condition,
else the instructions would be misleading unless the court wants to
broaden the rule. He suggested a term like "abnormal mental condi-
tion." This he admits also sounds like a medical term, but "perhaps
it would be broad enough to eliminate any problems and to focus at-
tention upon the degree of impairment rather than upon the clinical
categories of mental illness." He too suggested a form of instruction,
which, in addition to defining with some care what "abnormal mental
condition" meant, set forth the British Royal Commission test-whether
the accused "ought to be held responsible. '45
44. Mr. Hutt's proposed instruction would read in part as follows:
The term "mental disability" has a special meaning in law. It exists where
there is a substantial effect on the defendant's mental or emotional processes
and a substantial impairment or weakening of his behavior controls. You
should remember this definition because whether or not the defendant had
a mental disability is for you to decide. The diagnostic terms used by the
psychiatrists are nothing but medical labels, and are relatively unimportant.
What is important is the psychiatrist's description of the defendant's mental
and emotional processes, and his behavior controls, at or near the time of the
alleged crimes.
You are instructed to consider the defendant's emotional processes as well as
his mental functioning. A substantial impairment of either is sufficient to
show a mental disability. This may take the form of an uncontrollable
or irresistible impulse, or may be the result of a more deep-seated problem
with a long history. Neither the cause of a disability nor the length of its
history are important.
You are further instructed that a mental disability is often difficult to diagnose,
and that it is not a condition that has tangible symptoms that can easily be
seen like physical disabilities. Mental disabilities can manifest themselves in
very subtle ways in the person's daily life. It is therefore important that you
give close consideration to the descriptions of the defendant's background,
development, adaptation and functioning.
You should ask yourself the following questions. First, was there a sub-
stantial effect on the defendant's mental or emotional processes? Second, if
there was a substantial effect on the defendant's mental or emotional proc-
esses, was his behavior also substantially impaired or weakened? If you an-
swer both questions "yes," you must find that defendant had a mental dis-
ability.
Brief for American Civil Liberties Fund of the National Capitol Area as Amicus Curiae
at appendix A.
45. If you find that the defendant committed the acts charged in the indict-
ment, you must then consider whether he ought to be held responsible for
the crime or whether instead he should be acquitted because of an abnormal
mental condition. In order to acquit on this ground, you must find that the
acts committed by the defendant were related to an abnormal mental condi-
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Irrespective of the test adopted, a cluster of practical problems faces
the courts in insanity cases. Most criminal defendants are indigent
and so without easy access to legal and psychiatric assistance. "In
a long line of cases," as Judge Bazelon says, "we have been asked to
confront difficult questions concerning the right to an adequate psy-
chiatric examination, the right to psychiatric assistance in the prepara-
tion of the defense, the right to counsel at various stages of the process,
the role and responsibility of a government expert who testifies on,
behalf of an indigent defendant, the burden of proof, the right to treat-
ment during postacquittal hospitalization, and many more. If the
promise of Durham has not been fulfilled, the primary explanation lies
in our answers, or lack of answers, to those questions."46
Most of these questions are just as pertinent in other jurisdictions
as in the District of Columbia, even though most other courts have
done even less in the way of finding answers. Here we can do no more
than point up some of them.
1. Conflicts of interest when hospital doctors are called to testify.
In many jurisdictions, as in the District of Columbia, a defendant
who pleads insanity or whose mental condition seems to be in ques-
tion may be sent to a state hospital or other institution (in the District,
St. Elizabeths Hospital) for observation and examination. If the hos-
pital doctors report that he is not mentally ill, the court may fear that
he would promptly be released if found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity. Also, the doctors who examined him may consciously or un-
consciously be influenced in making their diagnosis by the prospect
that if found not guilty by reason of insanity, he will be returned to
them for hospital care, and would pose difficult control problems.
Should courts therefore refuse to permit the prosecution to rely on
tion that impaired his mental or emotional processes. By that, I mean a
condition that made it considerably more difficult for him to appreciate that
what he did was wrong or to control his conduct. This sort of impairment,
of course, may be of different degrees. If a person is completely deprived
of the ability to appreciate that what he is doing is wrong or to keep from
doing it, naturally he should be acquitted. But the law does not require
that the impairment be so grave before a defendant may be acquitted. A
lesser degree of impairment may be sufficient. It is up to you to decide
vhether defendant had such an abnormal mental condition, and if he did
whether the impairment was substantial enough, and was so related to the
commission of the crime, that he ought not be held responsible.
Brief of William H. Dempsey, Jr., as Amicus Curiae at 78.
46. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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experts from the hospital, if the hospital will have responsibility for
post-trial care? If not, will non-hospital psychiatrists, who presum-
ably will have had less time to observe and examine the defendant, be
able to provide more reliable opinions?
2. Adequacy of pre-trial examinations.
Under any test applied in any jurisdiction, expert opinion evidence
will have great weight, and the opinion evidence of the "impartial"
experts at the state hospital will usually have conclusive weight.47  It
is therefore vital that the examinations on which the opinions are based
be adequate. But state hospitals are likely to be understaffed, and ex-
aminations may be inadequate. A person may be committed for a
thirty-day period of observation, yet be seen by a psychiatrist for only
an hour or two during that entire period. Observations by the nursing
staff, psychologists and other personnel may not regularly be conveyed
to the medical staff members who make the diagnosis. Background
information about the patient may be nil. The prosecution may not
have transmitted to the hospital much, if any, information concerning
the facts surrounding the alleged crime. The examining psychiatrists
thus may have little more information about the alleged crime than
the defendant's version.
3. Presenting adequate medical explanation in non-jury cases.
In the District, some ninety percent of the criminal cases involving
the defense of insanity are tried by the court without a jury. Elsewhere,
the percentage is also high. At such non-jury trials, the expert testi-
mony is most brief-notwithstanding the Court of Appeals' strenuous
efforts to get the psychiatrists to discuss, in lay language, the whole
course of the defendant's life. In practice, these trials resemble the
taking of guilty pleas rather than an adversary trial. Trial courts tend
to use a standard order, simply asking the hospital for a conclusory
statement on whether the defendant does or does not meet the test,
and the hospital obliges with a short and categorical answer. The
Court of Appeals, and the appellate courts in other jurisdictions, may
call for "description and explanation of the origin, development and
manifestations of the alleged disease," 48 but busy trial judges some-
47. See Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48
M~cH. L. REv. 961 (1950).
48. Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1959). "The chief value
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times express impatience at long reports; all they want is the answer to
the ultimate question.
No change of wording of the test will affect this situation. Pres-
sure will continue to exist for achieving a bargained defense that
takes up a minimum of time and disposes of the case to the satisfaction
of both sides: victory (i.e. an acquittal--of sorts) for the defense at-
torney, and for the prosecution a disposition that assures long-term
incarceration.
Whether this practice makes for optimum disposition of defendants
is debatable. It probably results in sending to the hospital a certain
number with whom hospitals are probably not more competent to deal
than are prisons; the antisocial personality (sociopath or psychopath)
is an example. On the other hand, because of the inadequacy of ex-
ainations already mentioned, a certain number of treatable mentally
ill offenders are overlooked and sent to prison. One solution would
be a well-staffed mental facility within the prison system, but few
states have this. The courts, it has been suggested,49 could take it on
themselves to explore with the psychiatrists whether the hospital is the
best place for the defendant, even if he does suffer from a recognized
form of mental illness.
4. Permitting counsel to attend hospital staff meetings.
In the District of Columbia, the courts have faced demands that coun-
sel be allowed to sit in on hospital staff conferences at which the cli-
ent's mental condition is discussed and a report to the court agreed
upon.", St. Elizabeths Hospital has resisted such requests, on the
ground that it would impede full and frank discussion among the doc-
tors. The argument is made, however, that this is a "critical stage" in
the proceedings, at which the right to counsel is constitutionally guar-
anteed. The right to cross-examine the doctors concerning what took
place in the conference is not an adequate substitute, because the doc-
tors are likely to have forgotten the specifics of any one of the hundreds
of cases they pass upon. One benefit would be that attendance at such
of an expert's testimony," the court in that case went on to say, "rests upon the ma-
terial ...and the reasoning by which he progresses from his material to his conclu-
sion; ...that is, how it occurred, developed, and affected the mental and emotional
processes of the defendant; it does not lie in his mere expression of conclusion."
49. Brief of Prof. David L. Chambers, II, as Amicus Curiae at 34.
50. Thornton v. Corcoran, 407 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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conferences would not merely enable counsel better to examine and
cross-examine the doctors, but give counsel a fuller and sounder under-
standing of the dynamics of the client's mental condition and behavior.
Professor David L. Chambers, II, reports"' that at least one facility,
the Forensic Psychiatry Center at Ypsilanti, Michigan, does from time
to time invite defense counsel to attend staff conferences on the issue
of competency to stand trial, and that the practice has been found mu-
tually beneficial.
5. Instructing the jury before the trial concerning the insanity de-
fense.
Should our traditional practice of instructing the jury on the law
only at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence be changed in
these cases, and the jury told at the outset what they need to know?
Would the jury be able better to evaluate testimony, expert and non-
expert, concerning the defendant's condition if they knew what the
legal test was? Absent such knowledge, may they assume that if they
find the accused "not guilty by reason of insanity" he will walk out
of the courthouse a free man? We have few data on which to base an-
swers to these questions. Some judges do give the jury some intro-
ductory explanations, but Professor Chambers suggested that the prac-
tice be formalized, and he offered a form of wording.52 Such a prac-
tice would not be wholly unprecedented. In Washington v. United
States,13 the Court of Appeals devised a special instruction to be read to
each expert witness before he began to testify, to inform such witness
(and the jury) the nature of the questions to be asked in insanity cases.
The court in the Brawner case has given answers to a number of
questions. But questions such as those listed above remain. New ones
may arise out of the answers provided. It is not likely that a court that
has labored so painstakingly over the many facets of the insanity de-
fense will want to or be able to shrug off the questions that will continue
to confront it.
51. Brief of Prof. David L. Chambers, III, as Amicus Curiae at 27.
52. Id. at 22-24.
53. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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